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Abstract
It is almost universally accepted that traditional provider-patient relationships should be governed, at least in part,
by the ethical principles set forth by Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of biomedical
ethics, 1979). These principles include autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice (Beauchamp and
Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics, 1979). Recently, however, the nature of medial practice has changed. The
pervasive presence of computer technology in medicine raises interesting ethical questions. In this paper we argue
that some software designers should be considered health care providers and thus be subject the ethical principles
incumbent upon “traditional” providers. We argue that these ethical responsibilities should be applied explicitly
rather than as a passive, implicit, set of guidelines.
Introduction
One of the fundamental raison-d’etres of bioethics is to
protect the patient from providers who have the power
to make diagnostic and treatment decisions. While in
the past the providers’ power to harm (and benefit) in a
medical context has been limited to traditional “health-
care” roles such as literally seeing a patient in the office,
technology has changed the scope of what can be con-
sidered a provider-patient relationship. Two obvious ex-
amples of this are telemedicine and email; there is no
longer any need for the patient and the provider to be in
the same place nor even to interact synchronously. A
less obvious example, we will argue, is code written for
devices such as pacemakers and ventilators and code
written into an “expert system”. In this paper we will
examine the relationship between those who design
medically related software and patients. It is our conten-
tion that at least in some cases a provider-patient
relationship is established between those who design
software and the patients whose diagnoses and treat-
ments are dependent on that software.
We have to accomplish several goals in order to estab-
lish our case. First, we will show that decision support al-
gorithms directly affect patient diagnosis and treatment.
Software that has no effect on patients obviously can
cause no benefit or harm. Second, we will show that deci-
sion support computer algorithms differ in some funda-
mental way from the “decision support” information in
books and that this difference is enough to establish a new
form of provider-patient relationship. Lastly, we will show
that there is a reason to believe that software designers
have some responsibility to the patient beyond that dic-
tated by business ethics. If there is an ethical responsibility
that mirrors that of a traditional provider, then we can
infer a provider-patient relationship of some sort.
Methods
No data was collected for this paper. The paper develops
an ethical framework for considering programmers as
providers and is entirely a thought piece.
The players and the extent of our claim
It is important to first establish exactly whom we are
talking about. When we use the term software designer,
programmer and similar terms, we are talking about the
person or people who have developed the algorithms for
product control (such as pacemaker programming) or
who have influenced the decision making process for ex-
pert systems. We are not including actual coders in our
definition except to the extent that coding decisions play
some role in the algorithm or expert system’s “thought
processes.” When we use the term “software”, we stipu-
late that it refers only to decision support algorithms/
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computer-aided diagnosis/expert systems and not to
electronic books, etc. We will make the distinction be-
tween these two categories clear further on in the paper.
It is also important to state up front that we are not
claiming, nor are we trying to establish, that the
provider-patient relationship for a software designer is
the same as that of a traditional health care provider and
her patient. However, we will argue that there are ethical
duties from a bioethical perspective incumbent on the
software designer as a provider. In any single case, the
strength of these duties will depend on the degree to
which decision-making algorithms or computerized pro-
tocols influence patient diagnosis or treatment.
Why ask this question?
Why have this discussion? Because this is not a theoret-
ical exercise. We already have medical devices that re-
flect the decision making of the software designer which
have direct patient impact. One example of this is pace-
makers. Take, for example, a 2013 study published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)
[2]. This study looked at the effect of pacemaker pro-
gramming on the diagnosis and treatment of arrhyth-
mias. It found that if the pacemaker was programmed to
allow a longer period of arrhythmia detection before de-
livering a shock, fewer inappropriate shocks were deliv-
ered. While this particular study did not show a
difference in mortality between the long and short detec-
tion time groups, this is likely because it only lasted for
1 year. In fact, prior studies have shown that allowing a
longer time for arrhythmia detection before delivering a
shock improves mortality [3]. So, the diagnostic and
treatment algorithms designed for these pacemakers
have a direct effect on patient outcome. This outcome is
a direct reflection of the algorithm designer’s thought
process and programming. A second illustrative example
is the case of ventilator control software. Here, the pro-
grammer is no different from the physical provider at
the bedside who orders changes to ventilator settings
based on patient parameters. Even though this is done
“automatically” based on programming, the software re-
flects the same type of thinking/decision making as that
of a bedside provider. In both of these cases, despite the
physical absence of the programmer, the programmer-
patient interaction is no less real from a consequentialist
perspective. In fact, there has been at least one Class I
recall of ventilators based on faulty software [4]. A third
example is found in computer-aided diagnosis. A 2013
study published in the Annals of Internal Medicine
found that computer aided detection in screening mam-
mography leads to more false-positive mammograms as
well as more diagnoses of ductal carcinoma in situ [5].
The software is influencing decision making as evi-
denced by more biopsies performed in the computer-
aided diagnosis group versus those suggested by stand-
ard, unaided, mammography readers. Presumably, this
also leads to more complications, etc. in women who
have had computer aided mammography. This is not a
benign outcome; we already over-diagnose breast cancer
leading to unnecessary interventions [6]. Finding more
in situ disease will inevitably lead to more interventions
of questionable benefit. So, not only does the software
affect decision-making but, at least in this case, may
cause more harm than good.
We have shown that programmers can have a direct
effect on patient outcomes. But the importance of this
discussion goes beyond the current scope of medical
software; this discussion is also important to the future
of medicine. The age of decision-making expert systems
acting on their own is no longer speculative. IBM is de-
veloping “Watson,” a computer dedicated to medical
diagnosis (Kelly, 2014 [7]). In fact, it has been claimed
that, “…..something like Watson will soon be the world’s
best diagnostician—whether machine or human (Kelly,
2014 [7]).” Given this claim, it behooves us to determine
the moral standing of the computer and those behind it.
Setting the stage
To this point we have shown that software influences
patient care. But does this lead to a provider-patient re-
lationship? To initiate this discussion, a thought experi-
ment is in order. Let’s look at an example taken from
the annals of science fiction, Star Trek to be exact. Dr.
McCoy is dependent to a large degree on his “medical
tricorder.” In fact, about the only medical advice that Dr.
McCoy can give without a medical tricorder is, “He’s
dead, Jim.” (and half of the time he is wrong….). The
“medical tricorder” is essentially acting as a consultant
in absentia giving advice based on programmed algo-
rithms. The only difference between the medical tricor-
der and a consultant is the proximity of the individual
giving advice to the patient. In the case of a live consult-
ant, the consultant is generally at the bedside. In the case
of the tricorder, the consultant’s “thinking” about the case
is coded by the programmer. The same type of informa-
tion is collected and digested as would be in an “in per-
son” consult before an opinion is offered based on the
algorithm developed by the consultant. But does the
software really reflect the programmer’s thought
process? It seems that the answer is “yes”. As noted by
an expert in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI),
“What we [are] actually doing when we code is describ-
ing the world from our perspective. Whatever the as-
sumptions and biases we have in ourselves are very
likely to replicated in [that] code” [11].
The diagnoses and treatments recommended by these
instruments are clearly dependent on the expert system
design. If the algorithms are wrong, the diagnosis is
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wrong. So, there has to be some degree of moral respon-
sibility for the software designer because errors in algo-
rithms and logic can result in patient harm and wasted
resources.
One obvious objection to this thesis is that Dr. McCoy
can ignore the advice given by the medical tricorder and
that the medical tricorder is only a consultant. If Dr.
McCoy judges that it is in the patient’s best interest to
ignore the tricorder he can do so. However, this does
not differentiate the medical tricorder from a flesh-and-
blood consultant. The primary provider is free to take a
consultant’s advice or not. That the primary provider
can ignore a consultant’s advice does not diminish con-
sultant’s responsibility for diagnostic accuracy. So the
fact that the provider can ignore the advice of the expert
system does not change the expert system’s moral status.
To this point we have shown that a “medical tricorder”
wielded by a physician (or other provider) plays a role
that is analogous to that of a consultant. Now lets re-
move Dr. McCoy from the scenario. We now have a
device capable of making diagnostic and treatment deci-
sions when wielded, for example, by a lay-person. The
responsibility for the outcomes here is clear: a pro-
grammed device is making diagnostic and treatment
decisions that reflect the thinking of the algorithm de-
signer(s) who evaluated the evidence and made recom-
mendations. So, essentially, it puts the programmer in
the position of provider, albeit while physically removed
from the patient.
There is a fundamental challenge to this position: In
the case of true artificial intelligence an autonomous
“machine” (with “machine” in quotes because the status
of such a machine as “person” has not been established)
will be responsible for itself. This is an interesting ques-
tion. To the extent that the development of the “ma-
chine’s” artificial intelligence is inevitably the result of its
original programming (as noted above) [11], there is still
some responsibility on the part of the programmer.
Books and computer expert systems are different in kind
The reader may be wondering how Dr. McCoy “consult-
ing” an expert system is different from Dr. McCoy con-
sulting a book. It can be argued that expert systems are
no different from offering information in a book: Book
based information helps providers make decisions. This
criticism fails, however. First, in the case of autono-
mously functioning software (e.g. the pacemaker or tri-
corder without Dr. McCoy discussed above), there is no
human intermediary. The software, and therefore the
programmer, is the final arbiter of the diagnosis and
treatment.
Second, expert systems either autonomously make de-
cisions or synthesize existing data based on an individ-
uals symptoms, labs, etc. to come to a likely diagnosis.
This is clearly a different function than simply providing
factual information such as that in a book and allowing
the provider to synthesize the information of any in-
dividual patient into a diagnosis and treatment on
her own.
One might argue that in the case of non-autonomous
devices the provider is still making the final decision.
While this is true, it does not change the fundamental
difference between expert systems and books. A book
can be “read like a book” and “is an open book”. These
English idioms point out that information in a book is
(ideally!) clearly laid out available to the reader. In con-
trast, expert systems are opaque; the decision making
process is generally not open to the end user. This would
certainly be the case with autonomous expert systems.
When we trust the software, we simply trust that the
contribution of the software to our diagnostic accuracy
is correct.
Our final argument here is an empirical one. The legal
status of medical expert systems or software control sys-
tems is different from that of electronic books. For ex-
ample, the FDA classifies decision-making software and
“electronic books” differently [8]. One of the fundamen-
tal questions asked by the FDA is when determining if a
software program is subject to regulation or not is, “Is it
simply an electronic version of some existing library
source material?” [8] If the answer is “yes”, the software
need not be reviewed by the FDA. If “no”, the software
is put into a different category from that of an electronic
medical reference. Hence it may be subject to review by
the FDA.
Expert systems, programmers, and the provider-patient
relationship
We have established that diagnostic and treatment
algorithms can have a direct affect on patient out-
come whether or not there is a human intermediary.
But this still does not establish a provider-patient re-
lationship. One can argue that this scenario is the
same as a curbside consult which does not establish
a provider-patient relationship [9]. In the case of a
curbside consult, the patient has not been examined
and there is no contractural relationship between the
patient and the provider [9, 10].
We have three reasons for thinking that some sort of
provider-patient relationship is in play here and that this
is different than a “curbside consult”. The first is that
there is economic activity going on. The software de-
signer is offering herself as an expert and hoping to
profit from her design and expertise. In the case of a
curbside consult there is no economic activity extant
and therefore no contract, either implicit or explicit. In
the case of expert systems or medical device program-
ming, the designer is offering his opinion as an expert
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and is clearly “being paid” for this expertise, albeit not in
a traditional model [12]. We aren’t arguing that the
provider-patient relationship is the same as the trad-
itional one that we currently recognize. But it is
recognizable as a tacit contract being offered by the pro-
grammer: a service is being offered, is applied to an indi-
vidual patient using that patient’s clinical data, and the
programmer is being paid.
Of course, the presence of economic activity in and of
itself does not establish a provider-patient relationship.
Take, for example, drug companies and medications.
Here there is economic activity related to patient care:
The drug company is being paid for a medication. How-
ever, the drug company is not using the parameters of
any particular patient nor making decisions about the
care of any particular patient. Drugs are more analogous
to books: there is economic activity going on (one is
buying an electronic book or a drug) but there is no
interaction, face-to-face or via software, with any par-
ticular patient’s individual data leading to the offering of
a specific diagnosis or treatment.
Our second reason for thinking that a provider-patient
relationship is in play has to do with part of the raison
d’etre of bioethics: to protect the patient. We have
shown above that there is a direct effect on patient out-
comes based on software design. Were there no out-
come implications, there would be no issue. Arguing
backwards, this relationship meets at least the spirit of
what can be considered the purview of bioethics. The
ability to harm (or benefit) a patient by making decisions
based on an individual’s particular case puts the soft-
ware designer in the de facto position of a provider.
A third, and perhaps the most important reason, has
to do with patient autonomy. Generally, a patient will go
to a provider because he trusts the provider’s judgment.
The patient may meticulously research a provider online
(and elsewhere) before deciding whom to trust. Whether
this in anyway protects the patient’s interests is an
important question. But for our purposes, this is irrele-
vant. The point is that regardless of the astuteness of the
decision, the patient is making an autonomous choice
about whose judgment to trust. In the case of expert
systems the patient is unknowingly giving up some
degree of autonomy to an expert system without her
knowledge. It is not the solely the provider who is making
diagnostic and treatment decisions but rather a hybrid
computer-provider dyad.
There is a possible solution to this. If the algorithm/
expert system was completely open, the provider would
be able to understand and review each step taken by the
expert system in making a treatment recommendation;
the provider could review the decision making process
to see if it is one that he trusts. In this case the provider
is “asking” the consultant about his thinking and
questioning the decision making process. This will cer-
tainly lessen the responsibility of the programmer but
will not eliminate it. Again it is analogous to a corporeal
consultant: Kudos (or blame) are meted out based on
the degree of involvement of the consultant. For ex-
ample, if a consultant suggests one thing but the primary
care provider takes a different course, the adverse out-
come will be attributed to the primary care provider. If
both agree and there is a bad outcome, this will be as-
cribed to both providers.
Another possible solution is to let the patient know
ahead of time that software will be contributing to the
decision making process. This way, the patient will at
least be informed of the process that leads to the final
diagnosis and treatment plan and understand that there
is input beyond that of the practitioner. She can then de-
cide if this is a partnership she wants to enter in to.
Principles of medical ethics
So which of Beauchamp and Childress' prinicples of
medical ethics do we believe should apply in the case of
a software designer [1]? Clearly, it is not our typical un-
derstanding of justice. Software will treat each individual
the same, regardless of economic status, etc. This is with
the caveat that all individuals have access to the particu-
lar device, something not under control of the
programmer.
We would suggest that autonomy applies at least to
some degree. The patient is unknowingly ceding some
autonomy to the software; the software is directly affect-
ing the patient’s diagnosis and treatment without his
knowledge. Normally, we hold forth “informed consent”
as the ideal yardstick by which we measure patient au-
tonomy [13]. Problems with informed consent aside
[12], it is unreasonable to expect a software designer to
be responsible for getting consent in each case. As noted
above, a discussion with the patient about computer
added diagnosis and treatment might be in order. At the
very least it is important to let the patient know that the
recommendations are the result of a collaboration be-
tween the software and the corporeal provider.
We also believe that the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence apply. Beyond simple business ethics,
software designers, as a type of provider, have a respon-
sibility to act in a fiduciary manner and to not cause
harm to patients. As noted above, in the case of some
control algorithms and computer-aided diagnosis, this
standard is not being met.
The current regimen
The FDA already has a role in supervising some of these
devices. For purposes of the FDA, “Medical Device Soft-
ware” includes software “intended for use in the diagno-
sis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
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mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease…. in man
[sic]….” [8] One may consider this oversight adequate
protection for the patient. However, changes to approved
devices thought to be incremental innovations may be
approved without requiring the manufacturers to submit
any clinical data. Between 1979 and 2012, the FDA ap-
proved 77 original premarket approval process applica-
tions (including clinical data) for cardiac electronic
implantable devices while approving 5829 supplement
applications (without clinical data) during the same time
period [14]. The programming of the original device has
usually been changed and without post-approval surveil-
lance. This is important; if the algorithm driving the
device’s “decisions” has changed, so may the patient out-
come. While it is possible that each iteration of a pro-
gram leads to improvements, this is not a given. Anyone
who has worked with a computer has experienced
crashes and suffering performance after installing new
software. So the patients’ interests are not necessarily
protected by the current regimen.
It can be argued that software designers are already sub-
ject to a code of ethics. However, this code generally ap-
plies to business practices rather than the programmer-as-
a provider. The increasingly central role of programmers
in the provision of patient care demands explicit acknow-
ledgement of, and training in, bioethics to directly remind
the programmer of her responsibility in patient care.
Conclusion
We have shown that computer and other programming
based technology affects patients’ diagnoses and, by ex-
tension, treatment. As such, the programmer of such
software can be considered a category of provider for
the reasons noted above.
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